000			04264cam a2200529 i 4500
001			u158582
003			SIRSI
005			20240916205736.0
008			131028s2014 iluab b 001 0 eng c
010			_a 2013043064
015			_aGBB428096 _2bnb
020			_a9780226123912 _q(cloth ; _qalk. paper)
020			_a022612391X _q(cloth ; _qalk. paper)
020			_a9780226124070 _q(pbk. ; _qalk. paper)
020			_a022612407X _q(pbk. ; _qalk. paper)
020			_z9780226124100 _q(e-book)
035			_a(OCoLC)859446812 _z(OCoLC)859446813
050	0	0	_aUA23 _b.T48 2014
082	0	0	_a322/.50973 _223
082	0	4	_a355.0213 _223
092			_a355.0213 _bT521a
100	1		_aThorpe, Rebecca U., _eauthor.
245	1	4	_aThe American warfare state : _bthe domestic politics of military spending / _cRebecca U. Thorpe.
264		1	_aChicago : _bThe University of Chicago Press, _c2014.
300			_axi, 245 pages : _billustrations, maps ; _c23 cm.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aChicago series on international and domestic institutions
490	1		_aChicago studies in American politics
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 221-229) and index.
505	0	0	_gPart I. _tTheoretical and historical overview : _tIntroduction : Perpetuating the US military economy -- _tPresidential war powers in historical perspective -- _gPart II. _tWorld War II and the politics of defense spending : _tWorld War II military mobilization: origins of the rural defense pork barrel -- _tFrom shared sacrifice to local subsidy: dispersing defense benefits and externalizing war costs -- _tLocal defense dependence and congressional weapons spending -- _tThe distributive politics of defense contracting -- _gPart III. _tYou and whose army?: Expansive presidential war powers -- _tEconomic reliance and war -- _tExecutive independence in military affairs -- _tConclusion : The warfare state.
520			_a"In The American Warfare State, Rebecca U. Thorpe argues that there are profound relationships among the size and persistence of the American military complex, the growth in presidential power to launch military actions, and the decline of congressional willingness to check this power. The public costs of military mobilization and war, including the need for conscription and higher tax rates, served as political constraints on warfare for most of American history. But the vast defense industry that emerged from World War II also created new political interests that the framers of the Constitution did not anticipate. Many rural and semirural areas became economically reliant on defense-sector jobs and capital, which gave the legislators representing them powerful incentives to press for ongoing defense spending regardless of national security circumstances or goals. At the same time, the costs of war are now borne overwhelmingly by a minority of soldiers who volunteer to fight, future generations of taxpayers, and foreign populations in whose lands wars often take place. Drawing on an impressive cache of data, Thorpe reveals how this new incentive structure has profoundly reshaped the balance of wartime powers between Congress and the president, resulting in a defense industry perennially poised for war and an executive branch that enjoys unprecedented discretion to take military action."--Publisher's Web site.
651		0	_aUnited States _xArmed Forces _xAppropriations and expenditures.
650		0	_aCivil-military relations _zUnited States.
650		7	_aArmed Forces _xAppropriations and expenditures. _2fast _0(OCoLC)fst00814587
650		7	_aCivil-military relations. _2fast _0(OCoLC)fst00862889
651		7	_aUnited States. _2fast _0(OCoLC)fst01204155
650		7	_a _0(DE-588)4039305-7 _2gnd
650		7	_a _0(DE-588)4063255-6 _2gnd
650		7	_a _0(DE-588)4065004-2 _2gnd
650		7	_a _0(DE-588)7608093-6 _2gnd
651		7	_aUSA. _0(DE-588)4078704-7 _2gnd
830		0	_aChicago series on international and domestic institutions.
830		0	_aChicago studies in American politics.
949			_cc.1 _lON-ORDER _tBOOK _xPRINT _p
999			_a355.0213 T521A _wDEWEY _c5332 _i51994001712506 _f6/29/2023 _g2 _lCIRCSTACKS _mLRC _p$25.00 _rY _sY _tBOOK _u7/3/2019 _xPRINT _d5332